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Law and Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction t 
PETER GOODRICH* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the glaringly obvious fact that both legal theory and legal practice 
are, and have always been, heavily dependent upon the tools of rhetorical 
and linguistic analysis, no coherent or systematic account of the relation-
ship of law to language has ever been achieved. Even worse, the occasional 
exercises that modern jurisprudence has conducted in the direction of 
normative linguistics, in studying the "grammar" of law, or the philosophy 
of ordinary language, in outlining the semantics of rule application, have 
been exercises aimed at asserting or defending the positivistic view that law 
is an internally defined "system" of notional meanings or legal values, that 
it is a technical language and is by and large, unproblematically, univocal in 
its application. Despite the linguistically dubious nature of the assumptions 
regularly made by formalistic theories of adjudication, lawyers and legal 
theorists have successfully maintained a superb oblivion to the historical 
and social features of legal language and, rather than studying the actual 
development of legal linguistic practice, have asserted deductive models of 
law application in which language is the neutral instrument of purposes 
peculiar to the internal development of legal regulation and legal disci-
pline. What has been consistently excluded from the ambit of legal studies 
has been the possibility of analysing law as a specific stratification or 
"register" of an actually existent language system, together with the cor-
relative denial of the heuristic value of analysing legal texts themselves as 
historical products organised according to rhetorical criteria. Despite the 
common social experience of legal regulation as a profoundly alien linguis-
tic practice, as control by means of an archaic, obscure, professionalised 
and impenetrable language, no recognition has been provided of the pecul-
iar and distinctive character of law as a specific, sociolinguistically defined 
speech community and usage. The critical aims of the present introductory 
article will be those of endeavouring to develop an awareness of the 
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linguistic problems inherent in viewing law as a system of communication 
and of non-communication , as the rhetoric of a particular group or class, 
and as a specific exercise of power and power over meaning. In view of 
such aims, I will assume that legal language , like any other language usage, 
is a social practice and that its texts will bear the imprint of such practice or 
organisational background, and further , that as a discourse or genre , legal 
discourse, is inevitably answerable to or responsible for its place and role 
within the political and sexual commitments of its times . 
That there is as yet no sub-division of the legal genre that studies law and 
language in a manner comparable to the jurisprudential and socio-legal 
disciplines devoted to law "and" economics , anthropology, sociology , 
psychology and so on1 does not, of course , mean that language has been 
wholly ignored. Even within contemporary traditions of legal analysis , 
circumstantial, anecdotal , intuitive and arbitrary observations and remarks 
upon the character of legal language are common . These have generally 
taken the form of comments upon the vocabulary and the syntax of 
text-book and case-book law, and have also , increasingly, noted the pecu-
liarities of legislative drafting. 2 At their most extravagant , disaffected 
lawyers have broadened the scope of these perceptions into critiques of the 
verbal nature of legal disputes , but the significance of the linguistic element 
in this confrontation has been ignored: the historical task of systematically 
relating linguistics to legal theory, and conceptions of language use to legal 
practice, remains almost entirely in the future . For the purposes of suggest-
ing that this nascent conjunction of law and language is both an obvious 
and a necessary project , I shall outline the interrelations of law and 
language according to a very broad, historical schema. The point is not 
simply one of style or presentation. At the level of theory it bears a certain 
polemical connotation. Both traditional linguistics and conventional juris-
prudence have viewed their objects of study as being the "systems" or 
"codes" that govern, respectively , language usage and law application as 
potentialities rather than empirical actualities. In both disciplines, it is the 
abstract imperatives of a notional system that forms the object of synchro-
nic (static) scientific study; actual meaning, actual usage and the diachronic 
(historical) dimension generally, are largely ignored. Even the simplest of 
historical surveys, however, will clearly indicate that formalist accounts of 
language and of legal language are historically and geographically specific 
and limited . More particularly, viewed historically as a rhetoric or as a 
discourse - as linguistic practice first and foremost - the analysis of law 
as a unitary, formal language is but one - tendentious and motivated -
possible account of legal communication. I shall argue throughout that if 
linguistics is to be of use to legal studies, it will be as a sophisticated and to 
some degree scientific method available for analysing the historical seman-
tics of legal texts . Law, as a linguistic register or as a literary genre, can be 
described linguistically or discursively in terms of its systematic appropri-
ation and privileging of legally recognised meanings, accents and connota-
tions (modes of inclusion) , and its simultaneous rejection of alternative 
174 
and competing meanings and accents , forms of utterance and discourse 
generally, as extrinsic, unauthorised or threatening (modes of exclusion). 
To understand the coherence of this process of linguistic and semantic 
inclusion and exclusion is to introduce the problem of the relationship of 
law to power and to some extent to explain the characteristic modes of 
legal utterance as social discourse - as a hierarchical (stratified) , author-
itarian (distanced) , monologic (uniaccentual) and alien (reified) use of 
language. 
II . ORIGINS: RHETORIC AND EXEGESIS3 
If the price of specialisation is often sterility, it is refreshing to recall that 
the earliest tradition of legal criticism, forensic rhetoric , made no distinc-
tion between the study of law and that of the general forms of language use 
as persuasion and inducement to action. The overwhelmingly distinctive 
characteristic of classical rhetoric, that of Greece and of the first Roman 
Empire, 4 was the extraordinary breadth of the discipline and of its subject 
matter. Rhetoric was the study of all forms of public speech and, at its best , 
it was a highly elaborate analysis of the appropriateness of language to its 
context (audience) and its functions (practice - political , legal , ideolog-
ical). Thus , for Aristotle , " rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of 
discovering all the available means of persuasion in any subject ; ... and 
accordingly we hold that the rules of the rhetorical art are not limited in 
their application to any certain special definite class of subjects ." Rhetoric , 
in other words, is universal , and a few sentences subsequent , we are 
informed that " it is . . . a branch . . . of the science dealing with 
behaviour, which it is right to call political. "5 For Cicero as well , rhetoric is 
the study of useful speech , speech adapted to the context of its audience 
and their likely beliefs (topics) , speech likely to persuade by virtue of its 
relevance to practice (res publica) and the immediate needs of the com-
munity that the rhetorician serves. For the early rhetoricians , in short , 
rhetoric was to study speech as action, namely speech that would persuade 
by virtue of the systematic use of the linguistic and argumentative devices 
that render discourse relevant and effective , "eloquence ... bringing (the 
hearer) not merely to know what should be done , but to do what they 
know should be done . "6 
In synoptic terms, the great synthetic studies of rhetoric ranged in scope 
over a wide variety of disciplines which were later to be treated as discrete. 
The rhetorician would study philosophy ( dialectic, argumentation and 
proof) , politics, law, language and the social psychology of possible audi-
ences. In each of these spheres , their interests were pragmatic and func-
tional: in the context of the restricted republicanism and the various 
assemblies and tribunals of the city state, language was power for those who 
had access to the realm of public discourse . 7 Meaning, for the rhetorician , 
was determined by the actual social potentialities of communication and 
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dialogue, meaning was linked not ~nly to truth (verisimilitude/probability) 
but also, and just as directly, to the collective actions of the political 
assembly, the legal judgment and the ceremonial occasion. In brief, rhe-
toric studied the availability of arguments to particular contexts (inventiol 
general and specific topics), the manner of their arrangement ( dispositio) 
and the requisite style of their presentation ( elocutio). The study of law was 
but one subdivision of the rhetorical discipline, and legal arguments were 
not to be differentiated or privileged as against other arguments - the 
requirements of adversary justice and of legal judgment alike were to be 
studied upon the same basis as the other political and philosophical social 
practices. The rhetorical study of linguistic devices and methods of 
argumentation, applied just as much to the legal speech as to any other: all 
discourses were equal and their organisation was to be judged by similar 
criteria of what was essentially an historical and political form of criticism.8 
For Cicero especially , rhetoric was the instrument of practice and of 
practitioners, it was the art and criticism of public speech conceived not as 
truth (stasis) but as the active and "topical" argumentation necessary for 
the determination of the needs and choices of the historical and political 
community. In short, history and labour were the source of speech and of 
its argumentative topics, while rhetoric was the analysis of the propriety or 
appropriateness of the language and arguments used to the institutional 
and political goals of the community as a whole. 
Despite the great merits and the obvious attractions of rhetoric; its 
ability to study the determination of human behaviour and speech in terms 
of the contingent and topical, the social and historical, facets of public 
dialogue, as well as its conception of language as communication within a 
context and by means of the inherently figurative and ambiguous semantics 
of actual usage; it was historically and geographically short-lived. As a 
methodology for the study of language and of law, it was indeed excep-
tional to the dominant tendencies within the development of the European 
languages and early jurisprudence. Even the greatest practitioners of rhe-
toric admitted that it was dangerous,9 that probability was not truth , that 
persuasion was not conviction and that analogy (metaphor) was not es-
sence (necessity/uniqueness).10 Suffice it to say that the subject matter of 
rhetoric was too broad11 and the discipline did not long outlive the decline 
of the republican and democratic institutions to whose practice it was 
tied. 12 From Aristotle onwards the overwhelmingly dominant tendency in 
the study of language was the endeavour to subjugate linguistics to logic 
and to displace the study of speech as discourse or social utterance with the 
analysis of language as analytics (the rules of demonstration based upon 
univocal and necessary meanings)13 and a corresponding concentration 
upon the written text. 14 The democratic republican ethos of early classical 
rhetoric was thoroughly exceptional to the dominant , centripetal or unify-
ing tendencies within the European languages , and the correlative 
centralisation or unification of the offical discourses of an essentially 
hierarchial development of European linguistic culture. Latin became the 
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official language of medieval Europe and philology - the study of dead 
languages which, by virtue of that very fact , were "unities" - became the 
predominant method of language study within the culture of the various 
attempts to formulate a " universal grammar" or language of truth. 15 As 
against the rhetorical conception of language as action and of meaning as 
the effect of rhetorical practice, language was to be studied as "given", as 
static and written ; language and meaning were always already produced or 
"there", and merely awaiting the patient and passive understanding of the 
philologist or exegete to recover the true meaning of the text , itself con-
ceived as a unique and intentional , precedent, state of affairs. It remains to 
be observed that the rise of the European rationalist philosophies in the 
16th and 17th centuries coincided with the lowest ebb of the rhetorical 
discipline16 - it became the study of taxonomies of word based figures , 
the analysis of style , of the superficial , aesthetic and inessential features of 
language use. Rhetoric was displaced by philosophy and by philology, by 
the study of authoritative , monologic and univocal discourses in which 
meaning was conceived as structural and necessary, given from above and 
emanating towards a point below.17 
While it is obviously impossible to generalise the restricted status of 
rhetoric for the entire period in question , and even more invidious to 
attempt to characterise its role within the differing institutional practices 
and disciplines of post-classical European culture, it may nonetheless be 
asserted that the central theme within the decline of rhetoric was its 
increasing subordination to logic. The rhetorical was to be ever more 
vehemently stigmatised as a second order of language - as the word 
dwelling in a "borrowed home" - at one remove from the normative 
linguistics , and corresponding philosophy of knowledge , which postulated 
a primary order of language in which the meaning of words was singular 
and real. That meaning came to be conceived by the exegetical tradition as 
given or monologic implies that it has a source, an authority or singular 
authorship that originally sets out the meaning and whose "will" may be 
analytically or exegetically recovered. The paradigm forms of such mean-
ing are , of course , those contained in religious and legal texts. 18 By way of 
an introduction to an analysis of the dominant paradigm of linguistic 
analysis within contemporary positivist jurisprudence, it may be observed 
that the major historical legal systems have, in their ascendancy , resorted 
increasingly to the written text , and ostensibly to the exegetical or inter-
pretative control of their social practice by reference to such texts. The 
reception of Roman law in medieval Europe in the 11th and 12th centuries, 
which , in many respects , lies at the basis of the contemporary legal tra-
dition, was an exemplary textual enterprise. The first law school, founded 
at Bologna, was established precisely to study manuscripts , the newly 
discovered Corpus Juris Civilis. The techniques of legal science developed 
by the glossators in relation to the Justinian Codes were philological in the 
extreme, they were techniques which presupposed the absolute , Biblical , 
authority of the texts of the Civil law. In short , the first law to be studied 
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and taught in the West was not vernacular but oracular, it was contained in 
a series of texts which were to be comprehended as containing a complete 
and integrated body of doctrine, as the embodiment of reason and as the 
"source of all deductions". 19 While noting that periods of dogmatic crisis 
or of radical legal change , have frequently been accompanied by the 
increasing irrelevance , or in legal terms desuetude, of the written law -
by virtue of contrary informal practices the code becomes a relic - it is 
nevertheless interesting to note the continuity of the problem of textual 
interpretation. The code , or more informally, the written law, has invari-
ably, though with varying degrees of practical or actual relevance , been the 
object of an elitist , revelatory or hierophantic, culture of interpretation. 
An intricate and exclusive system of disciplinary or dogmatic tools , the 
various forms of traditional exegesis and of traditional and indeed contem-
porary hermeneutics, were developed early and precisely, I would argue , 
to the effect of safeguarding and preserving the sanctity and general 
impenetrability of the written word as a system of social control: "One 
doesn't carry on a dialogue with the law, one makes it speak."20 
III . THE DOMINANT PARADIGM; LINGUISTICS, LEGAL SCIENCE, LEGAL 
SEMIOTICS21 
In the space available, I can offer no more than a series of suggestions as to 
the historical and sociological significance of the linguistic assumptions and 
potential semiotics22 of contemporary traditions of " legal science" or posi-
tivistic jurisprudence. The contemporary status of structural linguistics, the 
degree to which "pure" or positivistic theories of law are scientific, and the 
utility of semiotic explanations of legal logic are all eminently contestable 
and controversial issues. Having acknowledged such a state of affairs , I 
shall attempt to evade the full heat of such controversy by examining the 
historical interrelations and interconnections of linguistics and legal science 
and by adverting briefly to the problems of such applications as have been 
made of a structural legal linguistics, in the context of a descriptive over-
view. 
The most striking and significant feature common to contemporary 
linguistics and legal science is historical. They share both the time and the 
place of their inception as sciences. The time was the last quarter of the 
19th century and the place, and theoretical context, was that of central 
European neo-Kantianism or philosophical positivism.23 The result was a 
common development and systematisation of language and of law accord-
ing to a philological model of normative science in which the object of 
study was to be the systemic determination of ideal rather than actual 
speech and behaviour. The problem, in essence, is that of the birth of 
structuralism24, that of an objective idealism, which I will analyse first in its 
linguistic manifestation. 
The inception of linguistics as a science took the form of a resolution to 
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conflicting tendencies within the preceding schools of language study. The 
polemical context of Saussure's work was that of a series of "creationist" or 
subjectivist theories of language developed , during the second half of the 
19th century and with considerable success, by various schools of romanti-
cally inspired linguistics .25 Their concern was to attack the scientific status 
of the dominant linguistics of the century, the work of the grammarians 
and the studies of philology and of Indo-European phonetics , which 
asserted, unequivocally, the uniformity of linguistic laws and the regularity 
of language development in terms of a proto-language underlying and 
explaining the individual variations of existent languages. As against the 
grammarians' view that there could be and were universals governing 
language forms , the creationist view of linguistics asserted that language 
changed and developed by virtue of individual , subjective , innovations -
by virtue of transformations brought about by speakers themselves - and 
consequently that the appropriate mode of linguistic study was psycholog-
ical , sociological and historical. 
To some degree appalled by the subjectivist strains within language 
study, Saussure returned to and drew upon the dominant , philological and 
exegetical, conception of language. Inspired by the model of phonetic laws 
of sound changes. Saussure posed the question of the possibility of a 
"science of language" in the neo-Kantian terms of a transcendental logical 
assumption as to what language must be like for a scientific linguistics to be 
possible. His conclusion was that the scope of linguistics must be defined , a 
priori, as the study of " the forces that are permanently and universally at 
work in all languages. "26 As the foundation of linguistics, Saussure inserted 
the distinction between language-system (langue) and language use 
(parole)27 and argued that the status of linguistics as a science was depen-
dent upon its restriction to the study of the laws of the language system as a 
normative ideal or synchronic (static) systematicity - as a set of logical 
universals , internally defined in a language totality conceived as a "state of 
affairs" existing (notionally) outside of society and outside history. 
The unity of language as an object of study is the limited and highly 
abstract sense in which it constitutes a "self-contained whole and principle 
of classification. "28 The overriding concerns of the science of language 
were to be syntactic, morphological and phonetic. It would study language 
in terms of its most basic units - signs or words - and these it would 
analyse in their relation to the abstract system or whole that determined 
their lexical or dictionary definition and their possible combinations at or 
below the level of the sentence. Linguistic validity, or grammaticality, was 
rule-governed; it did not concern actual usage but rather stated the laws 
and limits of possible usage in relation to the very broad contours of 
linguistic structure. Thus, for Saussure , signs were not meanings but 
rather, were to be conceived as elements of a code which determined their 
signifying function: each sign is the combination of a material signifier and 
its signified (its lexical meaning) , which is in turn arbitrarily or conven-
tionally given within the code , the system of signs as a unitary set of norms. 
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What a sign signifies is consequently largely irrelevant : its combination 
(syntagmatisation) is rule-governed , in that certain combinations are im-
possible or nonsensical within a given code , but beyond the highly vague 
requirements of intelligibility determined by syntax, the actual combina-
tions , utterances and meanings (parole) achieved within any specific con-
text are deemed wholly unpredictable and unamenable to any form of 
scientific study. In summary , the meaning or semantics of actual linguistic 
practice were the " other" or opposite of science - the language system 
was to be studied precisely to the exclusion of its realisation or application 
within the actual life of language - and for this reason linguistics has 
generally concentrated upon the unit of the sign at the level of the word -
as a form and not a content - as an equivalent (exchange value) in a 
system of signification (circulation) , set free of the process and context in 
which it came into being or was produced.29 Langue becomes the opposite 
of parole: the former was conceived of as rational , objective and norm 
governed, the latter as irrational , subjective and historical. 
A similar dualism can be discerned in the birth of positivistic legal 
science . Allowing for disciplinary differences, its polemical and pragmatic 
context was essentially comparable. At the level of theory it is indeed easy 
to see that legal analysis has always faced a problem analogous to that of 
the distinction between language system and actual utterance, between 
concepts of the code and the meaning created in its application or realis-
ation . It has been variously formulated as an opposition between legal 
system and adjudication, legal validity and legal meaning, norm and its 
volitional or discretionary application in legal judgment or practice . The 
one is purportedly objective (deductive) , the other subjective and fre-
quently discretionary. The more specific, historical , context of the Pure 
Theory of law3° is equally analogous to that of structural linguistics. In the 
context of legal studies , the threat to the dogmatic and exegetical tradition 
of jurisprudential analysis took the form of a wide variety of historically 
inspired, loosely creationist , theories of law.31 Kelsen's earlier writings 
clearly evidence profound anxiety as to the inroads that social and histor-
ical ( or broadly rhetorical) studies of law were making upon the scientific 
status of legal dogmatics.32 His solution to the threat , as is well known , was 
the reassertion of the scientific status of jurisprudence upon the basis of a 
Kantian conception of normative analysis . Legal science was to study the 
law in its "systematic" context , as a grammar and hierarchy of norms, as a 
structure: " the law is an order, and therefore all legal problems must be set 
and solved as order problems. In this way legal theory becomes an exact 
structural analysis of positive law , free of all ethical-political value 
judgments. "33 The condition of legal analysis as normative science is , for 
Kelsen , to be the transcendental logical presupposition of any legal system, 
the basic norm - the Kantian " idea" which founds the unity and form of 
the whole.34 Suffice it to say that the specific system of laws or norms is to 
be studied as a · logical, internally defined, normative unity. The legal 
details of such a science are adequately described elsewhere35 , the question 
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of significance to the study of law and language is that of the nature of this 
legal grammar or syntax proposed by the Pure Theory of law and to all 
intents and purposes carried over into the later Anglo-American juris-
prudential positivisms.36 
The grammar of law is predominantly a grammar of written law, and an 
analysis of the formal limitations - the underlying, governing, 
structure - of legal meaning. Meaning is to be conceived in objectivist, 
logical, terms as a syntax or hierarchy of authorisation in which the validly 
constituted norm or "ought" statement provides the objective, externally 
given, meaning of human behaviour.37 Recalling the Saussurian distinction 
between langue (real) and parole (fortuitous), it may be observed that 
Kelsen elaborates an essentially similar distinction between legal validity 
(real) and legal volition (fortuitous) or between positive law and the 
judicial application of legal norms.38 The Saussurian conception of 
language system - the code or semiotic of linguistic laws - can be 
matched, detail for detail, to the Kelsenian grammar of legal structure -
analogously, the code or semiotic of legal communication conceived as the 
objective direction of human behaviour according to a syntax of specifi-
cally legal meanings, or "pure" legal "signs". The linguistic problem of the 
grammaticality of an utterance becomes that of the validity of a legal 
statement analysed according to an objective syntax of "concretisation" or 
"nomo-dynamics"39 In summary, the study of both linguistic and legal 
structure as systems or codes, carries with it the attraction of clarity and 
abstract verifiability in terms of propositional logic and presupposition. 
These rather crude, early semiotics can provide a descriptive overview of 
linguistic and legal rationality and certainty which is not only comforting to 
those within the legal institution who have a professional interest in the 
belief or mythology of legal determinancy, but also the intuitive appeal of 
describing "the common sense position prevalent amongst most lawyers, 
judges and legal scholars today. "40 
The study of language or of law in terms of the notional code or 
underlying rules that govern the grammaticality or the legality of an utter-
ance, is of undoubted interest in that it can scientifically describe the 
mm1mum normative requirements whereby linguistic or legal 
communication - as intelligibility, signification or syntax - is possible. 
Intelligibility, of course, is not meaning, it is merely the normative context 
within which meanings are realised. Semiotics, in other words, is not 
semantics, it does not and cannot study meaning as actually realised or 
manifested in text or utterance as historical and local events. Semiotics 
studies the internal coherence of the object utterance, or the immanent 
logic of the text and adds to an essentially descriptive concept of the 
utterance or the text, the categories of a preferred metalanguage or theory. 
The predominant characteristic of post-Saussurian semiotics has indeed 
been precisely the development of numerous and diffuse metalanguages or 
second order descriptive theories of semiotic systems. The analysis of sign 
and code has become increasingly refined within the various and 
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increasingly extensive contexts of its application. Literature, cinema, 
psychoanalysis, law, anthropology, theology and aphasic disturbance are 
but some of the fields and disciplines to which semiotics has made a 
contribution. 41 
Within the domain of legal semiotics the major treatises have been 
produced on the continent. 42 While it would clearly be impossible to 
describe the full spectrum of legal applications of semiotics, it is, I believe, 
possible to comment upon certain shared generic features to those studies, 
and to exemplify these I will subsequently briefly analyse one reasonably 
typical analysis, that of A. J. Greimas. First, in annotated form, the 
development of semiotics has generally been in terms of the elaboration of 
various binary structural oppositions, within the linguistic system of 
signification. The principal advances have concerned the oppositions of 
paradigm (selection) and syntagm (combination),43 denotation (reference) 
and connotation (field of application),44 metaphor (similarity) and 
metonymy (contiguity).45 The oppositions are general ones, they refine 
and enhance the study of the sign in terms of the manner and rules 
governing its operation within any given signifying system (set), be it 
language, literature, the unconscious or law. Very loosely, different 
signifying systems may be distinguished and defined upon the basis of their 
characteristic modes of signification. Thus, for instance, for Barthes the 
ideological language - or more accurately, the ideological dimension of a 
language - is predominantly connotative, that is, non-referential or 
wholly symbolic in its application. Jakobson, whose work in linguistics was 
a significant influence upon the work of both Levi-Strauss and Barthes, 
made various applications of the metaphor/metonymy distinction to argue 
that, for example, epic and narrative literary genres are predominantly 
metonymic in their semiotic functioning, whereas romantic and poetic 
genres are largely metaphorical. Other studies have suggested that legal 
discourse, viewed in terms of its contemporary, positivistic, self-definition, 
is predominantly a denotative and metonymic signifying system. 46 
Implicit in the above comments is a further distinction of considerable 
importance, that between semiotics and semantics as it affects the oppo-
sition of language system and discourse. The distinction between linguistics 
and discourse analysis was originally elaborated in the work of the French 
linguist E. Benveniste and will be returned to in the next section. 47 Within 
the context of semiotics, the introduction of a semantics of discourse is of a 
restricted significance, in so far as the dominant tendency has been that of 
incorporating both categories into the overall, semiotic and synchronic 
conception of language system. The semiotician has not generally been 
concerned with the subjective, historical, social or diachronic dimensions 
or implications of the categories of meaning and discourse. Thus, when A. 
J. Greimas comes to analyse the semiotics - the syntax, narrative gram-
mar and deep semantic structure - of particular discourses, his overriding 
concern has consistently been that of elaborating binary oppositions48 
within the semiotic, notional, systems of signification, narrative and mean-
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ing. The legal text, for Greimas, is to be studied as an instance and 
exemplification of a precedent model of structural codes. 49 To this end, the 
analysis distinguishes - upon the basis of a wholly immanent study of the 
text in question - the levels of linguistic code (legal language is a variant 
of natural language), legal code (the norms and interpretative procedures 
of the legal system viewed as a grammar) and legal judgment (the language 
of "verification" and of legal validity) .50 In brief, Greimas adopts a view of 
legal grammar and of the determinacy of legal language as a logic, which 
refines but in no way challenges the earlier Kelsenian depiction of legal 
syntax. Thus, the possibility of legal grammar takes the form of the 
transcendental logical presupposition of any legal system, in which it is 
stated that the legal code, "the ensemble of juridical enunciations, could 
not exist except by virtue of an original performative act"51 or implicit 
constitutional promulgation. As to the description of legal practice -
" the production of law, of novel legal rules and significations"52 - this is 
to be understood in terms of a language of verification which takes the 
practical form of existent jurisprudence and the procedures of valid con-
cretisation. There are , of course, numerous linguistic subtleties to the 
presentation of the analysis which have here been overlooked. In the end, 
the point is that Greimas ' analysis adds nothing of substance to the com-
monplaces of legal positivism - it adds linguistic refinement and preci-
sion. In a sense it represents the apotheosis of positivism in the addition of 
a further layer of descriptive metalanguage superimposed upon the domi-
nant belief in the univocality of legal language. The peculiar feature of 
legal discourse (its specificity) is resident in its ability to " transform" and 
"translate" ( correct and verify) ordinary language and ordinary meaning 
into the closed code of the legally relevant and legally valid .53 So far so 
good - lawyers always claimed this as their role - but the interesting 
question of how this process takes place , with what content and to what 
substantive effect , it left unasked and unanswered. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES ; SOCIOLINGUISTICS, SOCIAL DISCOURSE, 
LAW AS SOCIAL DISCOURSE54 
Insofar as the study of the relationship between language and society has 
managed to transcend the structural analyses reviewed in the previous 
section , and has gone beyond the philological and normative specification 
of social relations and legal order, it has done so in terms of recourse to 
rhetorical conceptions of language and of institutional discursive 
practice.55 The concept of rhetoric is , of course , very broad and protean . 
In the present context , I take it to mean the study of language in terms of 
semantics and in reliance upon the view that social and institutional as well 
as linguistic contexts of utterance are determinative of both the form and 
the content of communicational practice . Of its cultural sources, Nietz-
sche 's reaction against rationalist philosophy , Christian theories of natural 
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law, and the denigration of rhetoric generally, is an obvious and important 
landmark.56 Of greater linguistic significance, however, was the contem-
porary reaction against the neo-Kantianism of Saussurian linguistics, 
developed in the work of V. N. Volosinov, and taken up in the more recent 
works of sociolinguistics which have explicitly argued for functional and 
material concepts of language use. 57 Three central themes constantly cross-
cut the distinction between discourse analysis - the study of utterances in 
terms of their rhetorical and communicative organisation58 - and 
sociolinguistics - the study of language in relation to a wide variety of 
social, anthropological, enthnographic, psychological and other 
contexts - and may be summarised as follows. 
First, a critical and negative point. The concept of discourse as intro-
duced into linguistics in the work of Benveniste and Harris has always 
rested unhappily beside the concept of language system as an autonomous 
or virtual entity. While the study of language could not conceivably deny 
the relative value and status of structural linguistic laws - the general 
principles of lexicon and grammar - the critics of Saussurianism and of 
later applications of semiotic theory have argued that the concept of a 
"unitary" language and the categories of law-governed conceptions of 
signification and meaning are one-sided and inadequate . Bakhtin is most 
forceful on the point: 
these norms do not constitute an abstract imperative; they are rather the generative 
forces of linguistic life, forces that struggle to overcome the heteroglossia of language, 
forces that unite and centralise verbal-ideological thought , creating within a hetroglot 
national language the firm and stable linguistic nucleus of an officially recognised 
language , or else defending an already formed language from the pressure of growing 
heteroglossia. 59 
Second, in pursuance of this initial point, the object of study in linguistics 
moves from system to practice , from potential meaning to the determi-
nation and realisation of meaning within the concrete and hierarchical 
organisational forms of social interaction.60 The object of study becomes 
the "actually existent" language system in its historical and social develop-
ment; the study of the "internal stratification" of the national language, 
according to "social dialects, professional jargons, generic languages, lan-
guages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of 
the authorities , of various circles and passing fashions, languages that serve 
the specific socio-political purposes of the day, even of the hour ... "61 The 
third and most contentious point concerns meaning and control over mean-
ing, the power to define. The semantics implied by the concepts of heterog-
lossia and of linguistic stratification is dialogic and wholly rhetorical: mean-
ing is never to be treated as "given" in advance as an object of passive 
philological comprehension but must rather be approached in the active 
and critical framework of its social, institutional and hierarchical discursive 
context: "Every discourse has its own selfish and biased proprietor; there 
are no words with meanings shared by all , no words belonging to no-one 
. .. who speaks and under what conditions they speak, this is what deter-
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mines the word's actual meaning. All direct meanings and direct ex-
pressions are false. "62 The question , in short, is that of the social 
authorisation - the objective as opposed to the subjective motivation -
of utterance meaning; the description and analysis of the significance of the 
syntax and semantics of utterance forms according to the broad framework 
of the social and institutional order of discourse , the attribution of value to 
specific meanings and discourses. In brief, the argument concerns the 
appropriation and institutionalisation of meaning and discourse, the pro-
cess of selection whereby a particular set of socially orientated interests 
and usages gain control of a discourse and define the social accenting and 
paradigm forms of meaning that are to prevail and to win credibility. In 
more general terms, the question is that of the social legitimacy of specific 
linguistic practices, the question of the social production and control of 
meaning in the form of an order of discourse which determines what can 
and should be said - in the form, for example, of a speech, a judgment, a 
sermon, a pamphlet, a report , a programme and so on. The question is that 
of who is speaking? "Who has the right to speak? Who is qualified to do 
so? Who derives from it their own special quality, their prestige, and from 
whom, in return, do they receive if not the assurance, at least the presump-
tion that what they say is true? What is the status of the individuals 
who - alone - have the right sanctioned by Jaw or tradition , juridically 
defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such a discourse?" In more 
formal terms, Foucault argues elsewhere that: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth : that is, the types of 
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means whereby each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth ; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true. 63 
Prior to outlining the specific linguistic framework within which legal 
language can be studied as a social discourse, I shall briefly comment upon 
such studies as have in part attempted to recognise the social context of 
legal linguistic practice. 
First, at the level of legal theory, some mention should be made of the 
theory of communication , or hermeneutic, contained in the work of H. L. 
A. Hart.64 In the present context, I shall do so by way of two related 
problems concerning the legal utterance's context, rather than by way of 
attempting any extensive account of Hart's well known and highly eclectic 
remarks upon the philosophy of language. In appearance at least, the 
adoption of the slogan "meaning equals use"65 or the comparable view that 
the meaning of a word is to be discovered by reference to the role which it 
plays within a "form of life", 66 has considerable sociolinguistic signifi-
cance. Closer examination of these theories reveals inadequacies both of 
methodology and of substance. 67 The linguistic methodology of Hart's 
concept of law has to be recovered analytically in view of the unsystematic 
character of his predilection for making passing comments, upon the 
nature of language and its relevance to legal decision making.68 Without 
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rehearsing the analyses made in. terms of the " peculiar" nature of legal 
language (it has no extra-legal referent) and of "core" and "penumbra!" 
meanings, it is sufficient to observe his utilisation of a general linguistic 
methodology which opposes linguistic/legal system (code) to individual 
utterance or realisation in application. On the one hand, legal meanings 
are "clear", "peculiar", conventional or institutional, while on the other 
hand their application is, in the last analysis, frequently entirely inten-
tional , and explicable only in terms of individual psychology. The residues 
of meaning which fall outside the deductive application of general 
language must be explained in the subjectivist terms of "illocutionary 
force" ,69 in terms that is of authorial intention and the generally unknow-
able content of the "other mind". 
In methodological terms the problem with Hart's positivist semantics is 
its naivety in postulating an unmediated relation of individual utterance to 
formal system or monologic whole. It is related to a problem of substance, 
the overwhelming tendency of positivistic jurisprudence straightforwardly 
to assert the existence of a social consensus as to meaning. 70 What it is 
crucial to realise in relation to this semantics of consensus is that its 
reference to law as "social fact" or to meaning as institutionally and 
conventionally given, is "artistic" or technical rather than actual or empir-
ical. The societal facts and categories normatively invoked by positivism 
are of no greater empirical standing than that of passing references to the 
unargued assumption or presupposition that law, as a form, and legal 
relations generally, both represent an agreed moral order and are exer-
cised within a static or synchronically conceived social structure, itself based 
upon a consensus, ideal cohesion, or, to use the wholly appropriate 17th 
century terminology, a social contract. Far from raising questions as to the 
actual social and historical form of life which law represents and 
perpetuates,71 the theories act rather as rationalisations of a belief in a 
conception of "man" and of social and moral order or codes, embedded in 
classical liberal philosophy. The development of a sociolinguistics of legal 
language has an important role to play in subverting the social amnesia of 
the legal institution precisely by evidencing the linguistic mechanisms and 
conflictual social reality of the production of meaning and the construction 
and manipulation of consensus which forms the object of positivistic rhe-
torics. 
To some extent, the major works to be published so far in the sociology 
of legal language, those of P . Carlen and of W. O'Barr, do indeed suggest 
the falsification of the systemic view of "given" legal meanings. In the 
context of studies of the linguistics of courtroom interaction they reintro-
duce the rhetorical concepts of linguistic stratification, audience and dia-
logue into the description of the social and theatrical reality of legal 
control. 72 What is at issue in these studies of spoken legal language is the 
linguistics and stylistics of credibility or meaning effects. The social status 
of a group-class-or gender-specific linguistic practice73 can be analysed in 
terms of the hierarchical organisation of legal communication and can be 
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classified according to the schemata of lexical , syntactic, semantic and 
discursive choices regularly employed in the use of one language (legal) to 
control , appropriate or exclude other meanings and languages. There are 
two implications to these studies which deserve detailed attention. They 
necessitate, first , a topology of utterance forms within which legal discourse 
would be one of many classifications of social speech variant or genre, and , 
second, a concrete linguistic analysis of the languages, codes and contexts 
of the legal audience. These two requirements may be summarised as 
follows. 
As a rhetorical genre (discursive formation) , the specific character of 
legal language is , historically, that of a predominantly written language. Its 
origins are religious and hieratic74 and its modes of self-presentation are 
exegetical (scriptural) and philological. The unity of legal language as 
developed by tradition and history is based upon an epistemology of legal 
sources; the "law-giver" , the "sovereign" or the legislature is always 
pre-existent , and is to be treated according to the elaborate etymologies 
and semantics of recollection in and through the text - restricted com-
mentary, citation, quotation , usage and the paraphenalia of repetition 
generally are the typical modes of legal education and dissemination. In 
short , legal language is a unity to be understood as the social image of the 
argot or language of elite or professionalised power; it is the language of 
authority, which takes the discursive form of monologue, distance (tem-
poral and hierarchical) , and specialisation. To comprehend the social and 
sociolinguistic implications of such a linguistic practice requires the classifi-
cation of the manner in which the social significance and status of the legal 
institution is reflected and reified in the organisation of the kgal text itself. 
The levels of such an analysis are those, as I have suggested, of lexicon , 
syntax, semantics and ideology. Each category is to be comprehended in its 
discursive context, and I will briefly outline in what follows one possible 
classification of the distinctive features of legal discourse as social dis-
course, in terms of a series of introductory observations. At each level, the 
question to be raised is sociolinguistic and rhetorical - in its broadest 
formulation it is that of who is speaking, to whom and under what cir-
cumstances? 
(i) Institutionalisation. The most obvious feature of legal discourse is its 
production within specific, highly restricted, institutional settings. In the 
terms of one recent study, " legality would be nothing if it were not 
supported by a network of institutions, a tradition of ideas which always 
encloses and delineates the domain within which legal discourse can exer-
cise its textual practice. " 75 The connotative , symbolic and ideological 
dimensions of the affinity of legal text to legal and social hierarchy - the 
discursive techniques and sanctions which restrict and delimit who may 
speak, on what topic and with what content - are of profound significance 
to an understanding of legal rhetoric. In one aspect, the entire process of 
socialisation into the legal institution, from entry into law school to 
membership of the profession itself, is an elaborate process of education 
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into the manner and techniques of deference and respect for the authority 
of legal sources and the procedures and languages of its hierarchical 
organisational forms . Together with the more obviously distinctive fea-
tures of the legal sub-culture - its ritual trappings , its restricted and 
theatrical institutional settings, the elite character of its personnel , the 
extent of its power to punish - attention should also be given to the 
methodology of legal study as a discipline based upon a hegemonic belief in 
the autonomy of the legal hierarchy and the self-evidence of its authority. 
In short , legal discourse is socially and institutionally authorised -
affirmed, legitimated and sanctioned - by a wide variety of highly visible 
organisational and sociolinguistic insignia of hierarchy, status, power and 
wealth. These insignia, the identifications of a privileged class, are what 
initially differentiates the legal institution and its discourse from the closely 
related domains of political , religious and ethical discourse. 
(ii) Lexicon and Syntax . In many respects one of the principal features 
distinguishing the legal institution from other institutions , and its disciplin-
ary methodology from those of other disciplines, is precisely its language. 
To learn the law is to learn an archaic and specialised vocabulary and 
syntax. 76 Concentration upon the derivation and etymology of a legal 
dictionary of meanings, together with elaborate rules and procedures of 
reference , delimitation and construction , facilitate the image of a context-
independent lexicon of legal meanings , an elaborated code , whose syntac-
tic and semantic limitations are systemic (connotative) and consequently 
intentional, insofar as the vocabulary and its manipulation are unrestricted 
by referential constraints. The self-contained , highly cohesive and localised 
character of the legal text are best analysed in terms of specialisation and 
the avoidance of agency - relexicalisation, nominalisation, thematisation 
and automatic figurative register - the syntax of impersonality and dis-
tance, producing indirect control in terms of attitude and generalisation 
rather than direct command or speech act. 77 Even or especially at the level 
of lexico-grammatical system, the specialised nature of legal rhetoric as an 
apparently unitary , internally shielded and valorised , system of communi-
cation is peculiarly clear. Legal discourse presents itself as a context-
independent code , as the authoritative elaboration of the logical entail-
ments of a distanced and obscure language system which operates by 
means of an elaborate series of textual methodologies of recollection , 
recovery and relexicalisation. Legal discourse is pre-eminently prior dis-
course, a discourse that is already " written" and requires only the addition 
of the passive philological techniques of reinvocation. Legal discourse has 
its primary basis in custom, and its vocabulary is correspondingly governed 
by doctrines of memory, recognition and usage , defined in textual terms by 
reference to extensive and obscure etymologies, inert and calcified mean-
ings and · procedures, and finally by an epistemology, in the last resort , of 
the "sources" of law in which words are transmitted by a dogmatics of 
quotation , reference, citation and specialised and restricted 
commentary - the techniques, in short , of a textual repetition which 
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disavows the relevance of the lives and commitments of its rhetoricians to 
the monologic symbolic usages which they discover and declare. 
(iii) Semantic appropriation. If the generic character of the legal vocabu-
lary and syntax are distinctive and important features of the language of 
the law, it is for the reason that they facilitate a number of significant 
semantic operations. Very broadly, the lexicon and syntax of the legal 
discipline constitute a connotative code , a code of generic legal meanings 
amenable to the syntax of generalisation and impersonality within which 
the normative reformulations, paraphrases and self-evident - context-
independent - meanings of legal discourse as a genre or discursive form-
ation are possible. The hegemony of legal meaning or the self-presentation 
of legal language as a unitary code is the subject-matter of the study of 
semantic appropriation. It is at the level of semantics that the legal con-
struction of meaning in terms of characterisation, instancing (narrative 
structure), presupposition and preconstruction is to be undertaken. 78 The 
question here is that of the relationship between law and other discourses 
(interdiscourse), most obviously evident in the legal depiction of the sub-
ject matter of disputes, the characterisation of the actors and of group . 
interaction, the relative status of conflicting languages of description and 
evaluation. In semantic terms, legal discourse is a site of a coherent set of 
synonyms, paraphrases, substitutions and equivalences generally. The 
legal formulation of meaning not only presupposes a variety of consensus 
as to already existent social values, but equally projects the image of the 
sovereignty of the legal characterisation of such meanings within the dis-
crete logic of the legal text . Legal meaning arrives after the event to 
reconstruct the discourse of others and to rewrite the diversity of social 
languages in terms of the purportedly neutral or artistic significances 
(accents) and relevancies of juridical sovereignty applied to abstract , indi-
vidualised instances of regulation or discipline. Semantic appropriation is, 
in brief, the power of the legal text to define its own, very narrow, 
conceptions of meaning, and simultaneously to exclude alternative mean-
ings, accents and contexts. 
Further, as the term appropriation implies , the primary issue in relation 
to the law's own definition of itself as a unitary language , is that of a 
rhetoric of "inclusion" or identification; that is, of a stratification of 
language of sufficient social power intentionally to determine the language 
and discourse exterior to it. By subordinating surrounding discourses to the 
authority of legal semantics, legal discourse must also exclude and 
stigmatise - define out - all such discourses as are inherently recalcit-
rant to the basic belief system and preconstructions of legal language as an 
ideology. To detail fully the semantics of appropriation within legal dis-
course is beyond the scope of the present study though it is possible, in 
view of the centrality of the issue , to outline the structure that such 
appropriation takes. 
The rhetoric of law is at its most basic the rhetoric of sovereignty and 
power, of rights and duties. It is the discourse of power in a dual sense. On 
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the one hand it presupposes the semantic constant of the ethical and 
political discourse of liberal individualism, of freedom, equality and con-
sensus as the inherent features of the unsystematised and unexamined 
social relations within which legal discipline operates. On the other hand 
these preconstructions of legal interdiscourse emerge in the legal text as 
powerful devices for excluding and obscuring alternative or oppositional 
readings and meanings of concrete decisions or instances of regulation . It is 
precisely the assumed universality of the rhetorical categories that implies 
their ethical and political desirability while at the same time allowing their 
highly refined manipulation within a normative justificatory argument to 
obscure the conditions and actual circumstances of their application. They 
enable the appropriation of concrete meanings, in the form of the in-
stitutionalisation of generalised control by means of attitudes and norms 
that never expose themselves to the threat of a detailed examination of the 
concrete motives and circumstances of their application . 
(iv) Ideology. Finally , the law constitutes a concrete sociolinguistic belief 
system. As a professionalised stratification of the national language , and as 
a discourse or set of discursive processes, it functions to legitimate the 
"evident" or assumed meanings, accents and purposes of legal discipline 
and the social order upon which it is based. The textual functioning of legal 
ideology has generally, though not always very helpfully, been described in 
terms of the "subject form" of its operation as an ideology. 79 The abstract, 
legal and rhetorical unity of the individual subject and the coherence of its 
acts (deeds) , works ideologically to disperse or negate alternative readings 
and meanings based upon historical and collective forms of social interac-
tion and change.80 What is at issue, specifically in relation to legal dis-
course, may be formulated in terms of an ideology of legal sovereignty 
which separates and opposes the objective unity of the legal institution and 
its language - that of an axiomatic and imperative normative code - to 
the equally abstract or notional particular instance towards which the law 
applying act is directed. Sovereignty and authority and the linguistic 
objectification which they imply are never something in themself. They are 
both a relation and a process directed towards the contemporary instance 
of regulation , the equally notional and unitary legal subject . Objectifi-
cation produces subjectification, the definition and delimitation of the 
object of legal regulation, the application of the norm to a dispersed field 
of singular legal subjectivities. Thus the subject in law is constituted as a 
point of abstract equivalence , and the ethical image of speaking person as a 
unitary and unique subjectivity comes to pervade substantive legal dis-
course and the numerous legally recognised forms of utterance -
testimony, declarations , confessions, contracts and documentation gen-
rally. More significantly perhaps in relation to ideology, the law fixes legal 
meaning to individual acts, conceived in the abstract terms of intention and 
responsibility, and in so doing it constantly evades the question of its own 
material and historical genesis or basis and effects. By treating legal dis-
putes according to the rhetoric of individual acts , the legal text reifies its 
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meaning and obscures or mystifies the real relations which form the con-
text of such actions and the explanation of their motives. By means of a 
process of individualisation or subjectification and subsequent generalis-
ation the categories of legal argument work to manipulate and transpose 
existent human beings - the diffuse, complex and changing biographical 
entities of motivated interaction - into the ethical and political subjects of 
legal rationality and formal justice. In broader terms , the legal use of 
language rewrites the individual , as it rewrites speech, in terms of a 
notional and static unity of reasoned intentions , the basic precondition of 
the law as the political-administrative discourse of liberal individualism. 
V. CONCLUSION AND EXEMPLIFICATION 
It has been my purpose throughout this paper to criticise the dominant 
view within both linguistics and jurisprudence, that would hold that 
language as well as legal communication are to be understood best as 
structurally determined activities , as specialised normative enterprises that 
can be studied scientifically according to the internal laws , or grammar , of 
a static, governing, code. The relevant objection to any such structural 
accounts of linguistics or of legal language is that it privileges the concept 
of a system and the desire for order, over and against the history of the 
system and the possibility of accounting for the actual relationships and 
usages that determine its realisation. It may, further , be suggested that 
from the viewpoint of the history of linguistics and of jurisprudence, the 
concepts of universal grammar and of univocal legal code , have specific 
political and ideological motives and affiliations , they are broadly those of 
the desire to present linguistic study and legal practice as specialised 
activities removed from the everyday commitments and discourses of social 
and political practice and conflict. 81 
It is against this background that I believe it is valuable to reassert the 
rhetorical, sociolinguistic and loosely pragmatic dimensions and contexts of 
any communicational practice. It is in many senses the defining paradox of 
contemporary legal culture that its ideology is one of consensus and of 
clarity - we are all commanded to know the law - and yet legal practice 
and legal language are structured so as to prevent the acquisition of such 
knowledge by any other than highly trained specialists in the various 
domains of legal study. To understand the paradox of the social discourse 
of the law requries an interdisciplinary approach to legal texts as well as to 
the informal practices of the legal institutions, and will include the study of 
the rhetoric of law, the analysis of the context and pragmatics82 of legal 
speaker and legal institution, the empirical examination of the functions 
and affinities of law viewed as communication and as function. It should be 
emphasised again , that these objects of study are not merely the subject 
matter of an internal analysis of the legal discipline and its formal self 
representation , they require as well the analysis of the politics of legal 
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language in terms of the social and intertextual character of legal communi-
cation, the principles of which are well captured in Bakhtin's view that: 
Style organically contains within itself indices that reach outside itself, a correspond-
ence of its own elements and the elements of an alien context . The internal politics of 
style (how the elements are put together) is determined by its external politics (its 
relationship to alien discourse) . Discourse lives, as it were , on the boundary between 
its own context and another, alien , context .83 
It is the alien context, the before and after of the legal utterance, that the 
analysis of legal discourse as social discourse must aim to recover or 
recapture from the interstices of an institution and textual discipline that 
has all too frequently and easily defined itself by means of a near total 
social amnesia. By way of conclusion, however, I shall restrict myself to a 
somewhat simplified rhetorical analysis of the case of Bromley London 
Borough Council v Greater London Council. 84 Confining the discussion to 
the intratextual politics of legal signification, I shall provide a preliminary 
analysis of a series of discursively important features to the judgments in 
that case, viewed primarily in terms of semantic appropriation. 
The broad contours, if not the details of the dispute can be summarised 
succinctly from the judgment of Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal. 85 In 
pursuance of an election manifesto, headed "Socialist Policy for the 
G .L. C.", which "promised" and "committed" the Labour Party to reduce 
fares on London's public transport services by 25%, the Labour Party, 
upon election to a "small majority" of seats, acted to implement the cuts. 
It did so by ordering the London Transport Executive to reduce fares by 
25% and thereby, we are informed, presented the travelling public with a 
"gift" of "millions of pounds" but simultaneously incurred the "displea-
sure" of the "ratepayers" by virtue of the subsidy of £69 million needed to 
fund the "gift". The necessary financing was to be raised by a sup-
plementary precept or rate which the London Boroughs "most reluctantly" 
obeyed. More accurately, one specific London Borough, Bromley, evi-
denced reluctance and "challenged" the validity of the precept. It might be 
noted, incidentally, at this stage, that we are nowhere informed that 
Bromley, a Conservative controlled Borough, is geographically located 
outside the principal London Transport networks and so obtained little 
direct benefit from the fares reduction, and consequently had an excep-
tional if not unique motive of self-interest for their reluctance to pay the 
precept. A final, somewhat ambiguous, feature of the case, was the Con-
servative Government's withdrawal of the rate support grant, a measure 
intended to penalise overspending Councils and resulting in an additional 
£50 million to the cost of the transport subsidy, which additional costs was 
also to be raised by supplementary rate, and was, according to the judg-
ments, quite unforeseen by the G.L.C. 
I shall observe briefly that the language of this introduction or 
characterisation of the case is already highly illuminating. As a putatively 
impartial description of the facts of the dispute, it is a failure. As an 
emotive stylistic characterisation of the parties to the dispute and a pre-
192 
liminary evaluation of their actions, its highly selective use of apparently 
descriptive terms is of extreme intradiscursive and semantic relevance , it 
signals ahead, or prepares the reader for the outcome which will later be 
reached. Of especial importance , of course , is the use of the word "gift" to 
describe the effect of the fares cut, its connotations being anthropological 
or festive rather than economic. In combination with the other qualifica-
tory factual and evaluative terms , it persuasively prejudges key aspects of 
later discussion. It should also be noted that , in terms of information 
conveyed, the details provided are uneven and very limited. Nor do the 
subsequent judgments provide any more explicit particulars as to who 
precisely is affected, in what ways, and by what decisions; aside from 
general and unsubstantiated disavowal of the " propriety", "fairness' or 
political "merits" of the policy decision, the contextualising details of the 
case are assumed as summarily stated. Thus , Watkins L.J. deems it fit to 
preface a remarkably bizarre and unargued judgment with the assertion, in 
his first sentence, that he has "no doubt whatsoever that the large reduc-
tion of fares . .. arose out of a hasty, ill-considered , unlawful and arbitrary 
use of power", and continues that " the ratepayers of this great city, who 
are unlikely to gain anything from it (many will in fact be at a loss), will 
bear the costs of what seems to many to have been an astounding 
decision. " 86 Just as Lord Denning omits to detail which London Boroughs 
were reluctant to pay the supplementary precept and why, Lord Justice 
Watkins fails to elaborate either on who was " astounded" by a decision 
which had been well publicised as a feature of an election campaign or why 
they chose to be so astounded. Of the other prefatory remarks , I will 
merely note Lord Diplock's formulation that "all your Lordships are 
concerned with is the legality of that decision: was it within the limited 
powers that Parliament has conferred by statute upon the G.L.C."87 
Needless to say, it is precisely the broad or limited scope of the powers 
conferred which is the legal issue at stake in the case. 
The omission of any detailed analysis of the relations - socio-economic 
and political - between the various , homogeneously conceived, actors in 
the dispute , and the replacement of descriptions by rhetorically significant 
assumptions, will transpire to be crucial to the language and reasoning of 
the decisions. Before analysing the legal details of the judgments, which 
details take the form of a broad series of loosely co-ordinated remarks as to 
the meaning of various passages and terms in the Transport (London) Act 
1969, certain other, seemingly incidental, peculiarities deserve comment. 
In the broad terms of administrative law, the case concerns the general , 
and indeed superbly vague, principle of " reasonableness" , whose defini-
tion, as a doctrinal restriction upon the exercise of statutory powers, has 
remained largely unchanged since the 17th century. Powers must be exer-
cised reasonably, fairly , justly and in good faith; or alternatively, they must 
not be exercised unreasonably, arbitrarily or fancifully. To these self-
identical or tautological propositions one can only add descriptions of cases 
in which powers have been held to have been utilised either reasonably or 
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unreasonably. Although the analogy would appear to be a precarious one, 
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords referred to the decisions 
of Roberts v Hopwood88 and Prescott v Birmingham Corporation89 and 
succeeded in eliciting from these arguably somewhat notorious decisions, 
general support or authority for the view that principles of "socialistic 
philanthropy" or of "feminist ambition" are "eccentric" and "unreason-
able", and from the second authority, the more relevant assertion that 
"benevolent" or "philanthropic" behaviour will not satisfy the fiduciary 
duty of a statutory authority to run transport services upon commercial 
lines found to be implicit in a 1930 statutory provision authorising the 
charging of such fares "as they may think fit. " 90 The Prescott decision 
concerned the granting of free travel to old-age pensioners, and while that 
decision clearly suggested a particular attitude towards provision of trans-
port services, the instant decision concerned radically different circum-
stances and distinct statutory provisions. In view of the general agreement 
in the instant decision that it was the provisions of the 1969 Act that 
determined the outcome, the analogical relevance, both factual and legal, 
of the precedent decisions and the use of the phrase "ordinary business 
principles", is ill-specified in the judgments, and largely obscure. Again, 
the reference to the earlier authorities briefly adverted to early in the 
judgments, is of a rhetorical or persuasive value - it suggests an amor-
phous background legality to the decision - but is not of any more specific 
or logical instrumentality. 
Of an altogether greater significance with regard to the instancing of the 
G.L.C. case is the politically curious view which the judgments took with 
regard to the respective rights of ratepayers, the travelling public and the 
electorate in the erstwhile democracy of local government. The issue is a 
complex and important one and will be discussed in greater detail in 
relation to the term "economic" below. For the moment, I would merely 
note the view expressed that an election manifesto is not binding. To 
regard an election result as giving a mandate to fulfil a specific promise or 
as creating a commitment, come what may, was, for Lord Denning, "a 
complete misconception." He continued to state "very few of the electo-
rate read the manifesto in full. A goodly number only know of it from what 
they read in the newspapers or hear on television. Many know nothing 
whatever of what it contains. When they come to the polling booth none of 
them vote for the manifesto ... they vote for a party and not a manifesto." 
Slightly further on, the reader is informed that "when the party gets into 
power, it should consider any proposal or promise afresh, on its merits, 
without any feeling of being obliged to honour it or being committed to 
it. " 91 Other judges were less ebullient in their language but fully agreed 
both that the electorate was only one of the groups to be considered in the 
implementation of policy, and secondly that extensive consideration 
should be given to ratepayers as a separate category, many of whom cannot 
vote. The duty owed to electors emerges as promissory and indirect, while 
the duty owed to ratepayers is direct and proprietary and would, on 
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occasion , appear to override the electorate's policy preferences. The cru-
cial question, of course, is that of the circumstances and reasons which will 
create a paramount duty to the ratepayers , a question which only becomes 
fully obscured when the provisions of the Act itself come under discussion. 
I do not intend to deal with the numerous arguments concerning differ-
ent aspects of the Act in any detail. As Lord Diplock expressed it , the 
language of the Act is sometimes "opaque and elliptical", it "lacks clar-
ity" , and is on occasion " baffling" . 92 Nowhere is the lack of clarity more 
. evident than in the sections dealing with the discretionary powers of the 
G.L.C. Under section 1 a general duty is specified in terms of policies 
aimed to develop and encourage measures which will promote the provi-
sion of "integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities for Greater 
London. " By section 3 the G.L.C. is empowered to make grants to the 
L. T.E . "for any purpose", in relation to meeting the "needs" of Greater 
London. By section 11 (3) alterations in fare arrangements may be to 
achieve " any object of general policy specified by the council. " I have 
already indicated the view that the powers granted by the Act as a whole 
were seen to be broad, in the sense that the language of their expression 
was frequently indeterminate. The Act confers "a large degree of 
autonomy. " 93 It allows the implementation of general public policies, and 
at several points the judges were concerned to stress that " discussion at the 
political level" as to the extent and manner of financing public transport 
"as a social service" by means of subsidies , and with a view to best meeting 
"needs" , was of "considerable relevance to a proper understanding of the 
language of the Act . " 94 Elsewhere, the court "must recognise" that such 
debate exists. 95 Aside from an incidental and brief quotation from the 
Labour Party manifesto , mentioning how " better services , less congestion , 
better housing, more jobs, and a safer, cleaner, environment" 96 were 
benefits directly and indirectly related to the transport subsidy, the case is 
remarkable for its utter refusal to consider arguments and calculations as to 
the costs and benefits - the effects - of the transport subsidy. On the 
other hand , the case is even more remarkable for the unargued and 
uncalculated assumptions which it makes precisely as to what the costs and 
benefits of the G .L.C. actions were. They did so primarily in the form of 
discussions as to the meaning of the words "economy" and "economic" in 
various sections of the Act. 
The semantic appropriation of the term economic was one of the prin-
cipal achievements of the decision as a whole . The process of in-
stitutionalising an acceptable " legal" meaning was marked by a superb 
diversity of discursive strategies. Again. it must be stressed that the context 
of this lexical and semantic appropriation was that of the general admis-
sion of the vagueness and indeterminacy of the Act and of the word 
economic. It was stated that the legislature itself had in all probability 
failed to resolve the political controversy surrounding the meaning of the 
word economic at the time of passing the Act. The Court was forced to 
construct its own meaning for the term. A wide variety of approaches 
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emerged. For Lord Scarman, the term "economic . . . has several mean-
ings. They include both those for which the appellants contend and that for 
which Bromley contend. " 97 He concludes that it means both "cost-
effective" and that the burden on the ratepayers be avoided or diminished 
"so far as it is practicable to do so. " 98 The G.L.C. has a right under the Act 
to subsidise the travelling public, if London's transport "needs" indicate 
that it should do so. In the event, however, the G.L.C. acted "impractic-
ably" and "uneconomically", "policy preference" wrongfully displaced 
"economic necessity". 99 At this point I shall merely note the apparent 
mutual exclusion of the categories of the economic and policy. 
For Lord Wilberforce, the word economic is vague, although it eventu-
ally transpires to mean that transport services should be run on "business-
like or economic lines," but, paradoxically, this did not mean that it was 
required to make "or try to make, a profit."100 It is to be understood 
rather, in terms of the dual duty owed to the travelling public and the 
ratepayers, to exclude all non-economic arguments and considerations. 
Before analysing what these exclusively economic considerations actually 
are, I shall briefly advert to the equally broad elucidations provided by the 
Court of Appeal. For Lord Denning, the 25% reduction in fares was quite 
simply "a completely uneconomic proposition done for political motives, 
for which there is no warrant ... . " The duty of the G .L.C. was to charge 
ratepayers what was "reasonable and no more", a duty to be balanced with 
a "conflicting" duty owed to the travelling public, by taking into account 
"all relevant considerations ... on either side. They must not be influ-
enced by irrelevant considerations ... They must hold the balance fairly 
and reasonably."101 In the event the G.L.C. had given undue weight to 
their "arbitrary" manifesto commitment, and had been less than fair to the 
ratepayers. Somewhat curiously, Lord Denning explained that he saw no 
difference "between abolishing fares altogether and cutting them by one-
half or one-quarter", they are all gifts to the travelling public wholly devoid 
of "financial rationality" - "why not 20% or 30% or even 50% ?"102 
Penultimately, Lord Justice Oliver adds to the view that economic means 
breaking even "so far as is practicable", the view that general policy 
objectives cannot "be an object arbitrarily selected by the G.L.C. for 
reasons which have nothing to do with the functions which it is required to 
perform ... It must be an object of general policy ... for the promotion 
of an integrated , efficient and economic transport system." Lord Justice 
Watkins writes of a "total disregard" for the interests of the ratepayers of 
Bromley "and every other borough of London." Running the transport 
system on other than "business" lines could have "disastrous 
consequences. "103 
It is the tacit content and motivations underlying the actual application 
of their Lordships' very general and frequently wholly ambiguous formula-
tions of the law that is the key point of interest. First , however, a brief 
comment upon the general interdiscursive form of the argument. In reach-
ing their conclusions, the judges utilise many of the standard preconstruc-
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tions of the discursive formation as a whole. (i) The sovereignty of legal 
discourse is not only expressed tacitly in the axiomatic character of much of 
the argument and its manipulation of evaluative epithets, but also explicitly 
in the assertion of the independence of the legal issues from the political 
debates and controversies. The Law Lords are not concerned with the 
evaluation of the political or general policy dimensions of the G.L.C. 
decision. The language of the text , however, would appear to indicate the 
precise opposite. The reasonableness of the G.L.C. 's substantive decision is 
a constant object of ethically imbricated comments, their duty to the 
electorate is analysed in some detail and legally circumscribed, and the 
meaning of the term "economic" is considered specifically in relation to 
general transport policies that range from the arbitrary and socialistic to 
the business-like and fair. (ii) A subsidiary device , is the reiteration at 
various points of the " artistic" character of legal reasoning. The issues to 
be decided are technical and verbal , they concern the syntax and construc-
tion of a specific statute. Again , however, the general evidence discussed 
in the judgments evidences the necessary interrelation of syntax and 
semantics. Any of a number of conclusions can be reached upon the 
wording of the Act itself, and the Act is vague and baffling (if somewhat 
less so than the judgments) and must be construed purposively, in its 
context and with reference to "all the relevant considerations". (iii) 
Finally , the instancing of the discourse with regard to the subjective rights 
and duties at issue. The dispute does not concern the socio-economic and 
political relations actually appertaining between different social groups or 
classes. These are indeed never discussed . What is at issue is the relation 
between and relative weight of three sets of abstract and in this instance , 
we are told, conflicting rights and duties. The electorate, the travelling 
public and the ratepayers are the actors , listed in the ascending order of 
their actual importance , in this epic struggle to tame power by law. Again, 
the issue is purportedly legal and so isolated from other discourses and 
from the realm of actual interests and their interrelationships. The rights 
and duties involved are statutory and notional , their agents are similarly 
context-independent legal subjects - empty discursive spaces which the 
judgments provide with morally and rhetorically significant contents. 
Suffice it to say that the generality of the formal arguments and the 
ambiguity of the norms or rules to be applied within the space of interdis-
course effectively permit the Court to institutionalise or appropriate any of 
a large number of meanings to resolve the case. One could indeed plausibly 
argue that the normative resolution to the dispute is of little or no rele-
vance or pertinence to the actual decision " upon the facts" - it would 
always have been possible, in terms of the latitude normatively available, to 
decide and justify a decision for either of the parties to the dispute. The 
question which arises , in other words, is that of why the case was 
decided - on its facts - in favour of the Bromley Council. There is , of 
course, no single answer available to this question. A number of different 
reasons and rulings could plausibly be extracted from the case104 although 
197 
the predominant issue is probably correctly posed as being the meaning of 
the word "economic." Devoid of any adequate dictionary definition, the 
term was to be appropriated in its various linguistic contexts. These in turn 
proved inadequate and it was deemed necessary to analyse, very briefly, 
certain of the economic relations actually involved in the case. At no point 
in the case, however, was any attempt made to prove that the actual logic 
or actual effects of the G.L.C. 's decision were "uneconomic." The inflated 
circulation of terms of moral condemnation within the judgments was not 
matched by any comparable analysis of what would have been the econo-
mically rational way to run London Transport. As one commentator has it, 
"nobody who had read anything at all on the economics of public transport 
would have concluded that the economically rational way to run London 
Transport was by trying as hard as one could to make revenue meet 
costs. " 105 Upon even the most elementary comprehension of economics, it 
is clear that there are numerous plausible economic arguments in support 
of subsidies, and further, that in terms of an overall analysis of cost-
benefit106 it would be highly unwise to suppose that one could characterise 
the costs and the benefits of the G.L.C. fare subsidy in the manner in 
which the House of Lords appeared to. 
In the course of a number of general assertions , the Law Lords appear to 
view the economics of subsidy in the highly simplistic terms of a straightfor-
ward, short-term, detriment to all ratepayers and a direct, gratuitous, 
benefit to the travelling public. As this view is frequently crucial to the 
reasoning of the judgments, its details deserve comment. It excludes from 
the outset the possibility of a short-term loss producing a long-term 
benefit in the form, for instance , of a restructuring and reversal of the 
decline of inner city transport systems by means of incentives to use public 
rather than private transport. The short-term loss is paramount, and their 
Lordships deem it to fall exclusively upon the ratepayers: 40% or less of 
ratepayers use the public transport facilities; 60% neither vote nor travel 
on the transport services. The latter are apparently the real losers and , by 
implication, receive no benefit for their losses. A moment's reflection 
suggests that this is not as obviously true as it seems. Two categories of 
economic argument would appear to support an opposite conclusion, with-
out entailing any technical economic concepts whatsoever. There are, 
firstly, arguments based upon benefits to non-consumers. Transportation 
facilities affect non-travellers in a variety of ways. These side-effects 
(externalities) may be beneficial or harmful but presumably it is permis-
sible to assume that where the positive externalities are valued higher than 
the size of the subsidy, the beneficiaries of these side-effects will be 
prepared to pay for them in the form of rates. The decision in the G.L.C. 
case made great play upon the hardship caused to companies and 
businesses by the fare subsidy. Two side-effects of the subsidy are directly 
relevant to such an argument. First, a cheap and efficient transport service 
will benefit businesses and traders in the centre of cities, insofar as most 
people who travel to city centre shops do so by public transport. 107 
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Further, social and recreational stimulus to the city centre will benefit 
other firms. There is no reason why those affected should not contribute to 
the cost of these benefits. More marginally, there is also the benefit of 
creating employment, which was specifically stressed in the Labour Party 
manifesto. So too was a reverse argument concerning the removal of 
unwanted externalities - that the environmentally and socially harmful 
side-effects of private transport: noise, pollution, death, injury, conges-
tion, and the costs of remedying these negative externalities, would be 
reduced by the subsidy. The issues involved are directly economic, yet the 
Law Lords denied the possibility of making these decisions ( to purchase 
desired goods) upon grounds which they alleged to be economic. 
The arguments mentioned are, of course, no more than a few, simpli-
fied, instances of possible economic analyses of the actual costs and 
benefits of the decision to subsidise London Transport. Of the more 
technical concepts relevant, that of "option value" (consumption without 
purchase) most clearly supports the previous list of benefits to non-users. 
Very briefly, the existence of a service is often of financial benefit to 
non-users. In the case of transport, financial calculations as to the purchase 
or maintenance of other forms of transport can be directly affected by the 
existence of alternatives providing an option in the event of the break-
down, failure or future and unforseen exigencies affecting the primary 
choice of transport. The financial value of having the option to use some-
thing is its option value, and while it may be hard to measure, there is no 
categorical reason for refusing to approximate a sum by way of taxation or 
rates. An analogous argument can be made with respect to those who 
benefit directly from subsidies - the travelling public - in terms of "con-
sumers' surplus", the extra benefit of the subsidy to actual consumers, 
calculated upon the basis of the financial value consumers place upon the 
services over and above the sum that they pay. If the overall surplus for 
consumers and producers taken together exceeds loss, then it is economic 
to subsidise costs that cannot be met out of revenue. Finally, the actual 
motive or reason for the G.L.C. subsidy in its original form probably 
approximates to a very basic theorem of welfare economics, marginal cost 
pricing - pricing according to the extra cost of providing a specific unit of 
service, once the capital and other costs of establishing a service have been 
met. The marginal cost of providing an additional unit of transport -
carrying an extra passenger - is likely to be relatively low. Pricing at this 
level will not cover costs, but it is equally arguable that it is an economi-
cally more efficient and desirable use of resources than raising prices. 
In conclusion, I am not concerned to argue anything more than that the 
above concepts and analyses are relevant - they are all economic argu-
ments pertinent to the reasonableness of providing a subsidy. It may well 
be that the economic arguments against subsidies are more persuasive than 
those in their favour, or that non-economic arguments could conclusively 
override the economic arguments. My point is more general. The meaning 
of the word "economic" is dependent upon its discursive context, and the 
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Law Lords, in assuming that it. was inherently uneconomic to subsidise 
London Transport , wholly excluded from consideration precisely those 
economic concepts and analyses which could have thrown some light upon 
the decision they were reviewing. In the last analysis , the patterns of 
interdiscursive meaning evidenced in the judgments analysed are , I would 
suggest, typical of the general form of legal justificatory argument. It is 
only by critically analysing the details of the language and discursive 
processes inherent within the legal text, that the preconstructions, prefer-
red meanings, rhetoric and ideological dimension generally of legal dis-
course can be rationally challenged within the legal institution itself. In 
reading the law, it is constantly necessary to remember the compositional, 
stylistic and semantic mechanisms which allow legal discourse to deny its 
historical and social genesis. It is necessary to examine the silences, abs-
ences and empirical potential of the legal text and to dwell upon the means 
by which it appropriates the meaning of other discourses and of social 
relations themselves , while specifically denying that it is doing so. It is , in 
short, politically necessary to take seriously the character of law as a social 
discourse. 
NOTES AND REFERENCES 
1 For a recent conspectus, see D . R. Harris , "The development of socio-legal studies within 
the United Kingdom" (1983) 3 Legal Studies 315. 
2 Generally, see G. Williams, "Law and Language" (1945) 62 Law Quarterly Review 385; 
H . Morris , "Verbal Disputes and the Legal Philosophy of John Austin" (1960) 7 Univ. of 
California Law Review 27; D . Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (1963); D. Crystal 
and D. Davey, Investigations of English Style (1969) ch. 2; W. O'Barr, Linguistic Evidence 
(1982) 15--29. For the first major French symposium, see the 1974 volume of Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit (Le Langage du Droit) . 
3 The most useful and accessible accounts of the rhetorical tradition are to be found in: 
K. Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (1969) ; T. Todorov, Theories of the Symbol (1982) ; 
P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor (1978) ; G. Genette , Figures of Literary Discourse 
(1982); Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric (1971); T. Eagleton, 
Walter Benjamin (1981) ; E . Grassi , Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980); P. Goodrich, " Rhe-
toric as Jurisprudence, An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language" (1984) 4 
Oxford J. Legal Studies 88. With regard to the exegetical tradition , by far the most 
impressive account is to be found in the work of M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination 
(1981) ; see also, W. Ong, Orality and Literacy (1982); V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language (1973) ; J. Derrida , Of Grammatology (1976) Part I. Of general 
interest for the interpretative accounts provided, see , F. Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy 
(1909) and We Philologists (1911); M. Foucault, The Order of Things (1974) ; M. Gluck-
smann, The Master Thinkers (1980) 34-65. For more technical legal histories , see, Ch. 
Perelman, Logique Juridique (1976); J . Lenoble and F. Ost, Droit, Mythe et Raison 
(1980) , and their accompanying bibliographies of continental material. 
4 The primary sources are, Aristotle, Rhetoric (trans, Welldon, 1886) ; Topics (trans, W. D . 
Ross, 1950); Cicero, The Orator (1952); Topics (1952) both Loeb Classical Library. As 
regards periodisation, see, W. Ong, Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue (1958) , 
T. Todorov op. cit. pp. 9--84; R. Barthes, "L'Ancienne Rhetorique" (1970) 16 Com-
munications l; C. Metz, Psychoanalysis and Cinema (1982) Pt. IV.; F. Moretti , Signs 
taken for Wonders (1983) ch. 1. 
5 Aristotle, Rhetoric (1886) 9 (Bk l.i. 1355--56). 
200 
6 St Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (1956) 323; Cicero, Topics 166--169a. 
7 J. B. Elshtain , Public Man, Private Woman (1981) 19-55; J . J . Rousseau , Essai sur 
l'Origine des Langages (1761) 72-73 ; J . Derrida , op cit., Pt. II . 
8 Cf. T . Eagleton, op. cit., p. 101 ff, K. Burke , op. cit., p. 23 ff. It is from Nietzsche that the 
aphoristic statement " rhetoric is republican" is derived, on which see P. Ricoeur , op. cit., 
ch. 2. ; P . de Mann, Allegories of Reading (1979) ch. 1. 
9 Plato, Phaedrus (1978) 259-267; Gorgias (1978) 459 c-d , 463 b-d; Aristotle , Rhetoric, 5-6. 
See, generally, J . Derrida, "The White Mythology, Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" 
(1974) VI New Literary History 7-74. 
10 Aristotle , Metaphysics (1957) 4 1006 b 13. 
11 P. Ricoeur , op. cit. , ch . 2; G . Genette, op. cit. 
12 T. Todorov , op. cit., ch . 3; T . Eagleton, op. cit. For corresponding legal developments cf. 
W. Kunkel , An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional Law (2nd ed. 1973); 
J. Dawson , The Oracles of the Law (1968); H . J. Berman, "The Origins of Western Legal 
Science" (1977) 90 Harvard Law Review 894. 
13 See, M . Pecheux , Language, Semantics and Ideology (1982) 45 . 
14 See , M. Bakhtin, op. cit., p. 271 , 286. 
15 See , 0 . Ducrot and T . Todorov, Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Sciences of Language 
(1981) Pt. I. ; M . Foucault, Introduction , in A. Arnauld and C. Lancelot, Grammaire 
generale et raisonee (1969) ; G . Sampson, Schools in Linguistics (1980) ; M. Foucault , "The 
Discourse on Language", translated as an appendix to , M . Foucault , The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1981) . 
16 Supra, note 4. See also, J. Locke , An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1979) 508 
(Bk III . X. 34) ; I. Kant , The Critique of Judgment (1952) 53; I. Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason (1887) xxii-iv; Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, op. cit., Introduction and 
ch. 1. 
17 See, J . Kristeva, Desire in Language (1982) ch. l ; M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1980) 
78-133 . 
18 On the exegetical school in jurisprudence, see H . J . Berman, op. cit., W. Twining, " Some 
Jobs for Jurisprudence" (1974) Brit. Journal of Law and Society 149; I. Stewart, "Kelsen 
and the Exegetical Tradition in Jurisprudence" (1981) Proceedings of the U.K. Association 
for Social and Legal Philosophy, Edinburgh . 
19 P. Vinogradoff, Roman Law in Medieval Europe (1929) ch. 2, 4. 
20 P. Legendre, Jouir de Pouvoir (1976) 157-9; see also , A . Glucksmann, op. cit. 
21 By far the best treatment of the issues raised in this section is to be found in M. S. Moore , 
"The Semantics of Judging" (1981) 54 Southern California Law Review 151 ; otherwise, 
B. Danet, "Language and Legal Process" (1980) 14 Law and Society Review 445; B. S. 
Jackson , Semiotics and Legal Theory (forthcoming, 1985) ; R. Carrion-Warn, "Semiotica 
Juridica" (forthcoming, 1984) Liverpool Law Review; P. Goodrich, "The Rise of Legal 
Forrnalism, or the Defences of Legal Faith" (1983) 3 Legal Studies 248 and "The role of 
Linguistics in Legal Analysis" (forthcoming, 1984) Modern Law Review; C . Sumner, 
Reading Ideologies (1979). On the more general linguistic background, see, R. Barthes, 
Elements of Semiology (1967) ; S. Timpanaro, On Materialism (1975) ch . 4; S. Clarke, The 
Foundations of Structuralism (1981); G. Lepschy, A Survey of Structural Linguistics 
(1982); A. J. Greimas, Semantique Structurale (1966) ; A . J. Greimas and J . Courtes, 
Semiotics and Language (1982) ; U . Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (1976) . For critical 
accounts, see F . Jameson, The Political Unconscious (1980); J. Larrain, The Concept of 
Ideology (1979); J . Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1981); 
R . W. Bailey et al (eds .), The Sign; Semiotics around the World (1978) ; J. Derrida , 
Positions (1981); G . Gillan, From Sign to Symbol (1982) ; and finally , the synoptic essays 
contained in J . Culler, In Pursuit of Signs (1981) . 
22 I shall be dealing here with the Saussurian based conceptions of semiotics, "a science 
which would study the life of signs within society . .. It would teach us what signs consist 
of, what laws govern them." F.de Saussure , Course in General Linguistics (1966) 16. For 
useful introductory discussions of this tradition , see T . Eagleton, Literary Theory (1983) 
201 
ch. 5; S. Hervey, Semiotic Perspectives (1983) ch. l ; 0 . Ducrot and T. Todorov, op. cit. , 
pp. 84-92; J . M. Benoist , The Structural Revolution (1978) ch. 5. The major developments 
of this conception of semiotics have been those of R . Barthes, op. cit. , A . J. Greimas, Du 
Sens (1974); U. Eco , op. cit., ch. 1. Since Barthes (pp. 9-11) semiotics (semiology) has 
consistently used language as its model of signifying systems, and where other social forms 
have been examined by structuralists (kinship systems , myths, fashions etc.) they have 
been likened to language in their functioning . What is at issue in each case, is the 
code - the underlying structure or system of rules that assigns or determines the func-
tions or intelligibility of the sign, in a manner analogous to the grammatical (syntactic) 
determination of the use of words in linguistics. See A. J. Greimas and J. Courtes op. cit., 
pp. 282-293 for a recent definition of semiotics. 
23 For the sake of completeness, positivism may be broadly defined as "any neo-Kantian 
kind of pure logic, which grants validity to an autonomous method and its objectifications , 
which is 'positive' in the general sense of suppressing the social and historical precondi-
tions of its own possibility ." G . Rose , Hegel contra Sociology (1981) p. 32. 
24 See S. Timpanaro, op. cit., pp. 192-218. 
25 See, G . Sampson, op. cit. , ch. 1; S. Timpanaro , op cit., pp . 135-170; V. Volosinov, op. 
cit. , passim. The " Vossler" school is generally regarded to have been the most virulent in 
its attacks upon the traditional objectivist linguistics of the period. 
26 Saussure, op. cit. , p. 6. 
27 Ibid. , pp. 6-9, 85 , 87 , 89. 
28 Ibid. , p.9. 
29 Ibid. , pp. 114-115 , 117-118. See also M . Pecheux , op. cit., pp. 55-56; J. Kristeva, op. cit. , 
ch. 1; J. Baudrillard, op. cit., pp. 143-150. 
30 I refer here to the principal works of H . Kelsen, primarily to H . Kelsen, General Theory 
of Law and State (1946) ; The Pure Theory of Law (1970); What is Justice? (1959) ; "The 
Pure Theory of Law, Its Methods and Fundamental Concepts" (1934) 50 Law Quarterly 
Review 474. For the periodisation of Kelsen's work and particularly for analyses of his 
various changes in position with regard to the theory of adjudication, see 0 . Weinberger 
(ed.), Hans Kelsen, Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy (1973) ; S. Paulson, " Material 
and Formal Authorisation in Kelsen's Pure Theory" (1980) 39 Cambridge Law Journal 
172; S. Paulson, "Subsumption, Derogation and Non-Contradiction in " Legal Science" 
(1981) Univ. of Chicago Law Review 802; I. Stewart op. cit.; 0 . Weinberger, " Logic and 
the Pure Theory of Law" (1981) Proceedings of the A .S.L.P. Conference, Edinburgh; S. 
Paulson, " On the Status of the Lex Posterior Derogating Rule (1983) V Liverpool Law 
Review 5. 
31 The most obvious comparison to be made is that concerning the use of the concept of 
" Volksgeist" within both linguistics and jurisprudence. As regards the former, see G. 
Sampson , op. cit. , ch . 1 (the tradition being that which runs from W. Von Humboldt, to 
Von Raumer and Vossler). In legal studies, see, Von Savigny, On the Vocation of our Age 
for Legislation and Jurisprudence (1831) ; H . U . Kantorowicz, "Savigny and the Historical 
School" (1937) 53 Law Quarterly Review 326, at 334-5: "Even language , with which the 
historical school constantly compared law, .. . (is) used by the school in a purely romantic 
sense, and is strongly influenced by the romantic conception of the volkslied which was 
also believed to be the unconscious product of the anonymous people." More generally , 
see Ch . Perelman , Logique Juridique (1976) Pt. I. ; J. Lenoble and F. Ost , op. cit . 
32 H . Kelsen , G.T.L.S. op. cit. , pp . 409-46 ; W.J? op. cit ., ch . 4; Kelsen (1950) Law 
Quarterly Review 486 ff. 
33 H. Kelsen, P. T.L. 191-92. The best introductory analyses of this aspect of Kelsen 's work 
are J. Cohen , "The Political Element in Legal Theory" (1978) 88 Yale Law Journal l ; 
J . Raz, The Concept of a Legal System (1980) p . 95 ff; J. W. Harris , Law and Legal Science 
(1979). 
34 I. Kant , Critique of Pure Reason (1897) 503; H. Kelsen, G. T.L.S. 434-35; W.J. ? 262; 
P. T.L. 7-18, 72-75, 196-200. 
202 
35 For analyses of the pragmatic and political character of this "science", see E . B. Pashuka-
nis, Law and Marxism (1978) 45-65 ; L. Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin (1976) ch. l; 
B. Edelman, Ownership of the Image (1979) appendix 2; J. Lenoble and F. Ost , op. cit., 
pp. 506-546. 
36 I am thinking particularly of the work of J . L. Austin and of L. Wittgenstein, and the use 
made of it in the work of H . L. A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence (1953); 
The Concept of Law (1961) ; K. Olivecrona, "Legal Language and Reality" in Newman 
(ed.), Essays !n Honour of R. Pound (1962) ; D . N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and 
Legal Theory (1978) . For preliminary analyses of the linguistic aspect of such work, see M. 
S. Moore, op. cit., B. S. Jackson, "Sources du Droit" (1982) 27 Archives de Philosophie du 
Droit 147; Z . K. Bankowski and G. Maher, "Ordinary Language and Judical Discretion" 
(1981) 12 Rechtstheorie l; P. Goodrich, "Antinomies of Legal Theory" (1981) 3 Legal 
Studies l. Insofar as the adoption of the slogan "meaning equals use" or the elaboration of 
a hermeneutic adds anything of substance to the positivist account of a syntax of legal 
validity, they will be discussed in the subsequent section in relation to sociolinguistic and 
discursive analyses of law. More generally, cf. J . Searle, Speech Acts (1970) ; P. Harrison, 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language (1979); S. Hervey, op. cit., ch. 4. 
37 G. T.L.S. 434-5; P. T.L. 2-19. 
38 P. T.L. 349-352. For a recent critique of this aspect of positivism, see, S. Henry, Private 
Justice (1983) ch. 1, and 220-22. . 
39 Compare F . de Saussure, op. cit., pp. 101-13; H . Kelsen, G. T.L.S. 216 ff; P. T.L. 
194-210. At P. T.L. 198-99. Kelsen proposes the syllogistic basis of legal validity, that of 
an interpretation leading from a major premiss - the objective validity of a norm - to a 
conclusion, the legitimation of the actual command, utterance or decision. 
"° M. S. Moore, op. cit., p. 163. Moore continues, "Formalism is not an antiquated theory of 
merely historical interest. The claims of contemporary theorists are not isolated instances 
of an impoverished legal education. Formalism survives because it is , prima facie , the 
theory of adjudication required by our ideals about the rule of law." See H . Kelsen (1950) 
50 Law Quarterly Review, 490 for a striking statement of those interests that dogmatic 
jurisprudence must, does and should service. 
41 For general overviews, see A . J . Greimas and J . Courtes, op. cit.; R. W. Bailey , op. cit. 
Of specific applications, the more informative and accessible include: C. Metz, 
Psychoanalysis and Cinema (1982); R. Barthes, S/Z (1970); R. Jakobson and M . Halle , 
Fundamentals of Language (1956); R. Jakobson, Linguistics and Poetics (1972); J . Culler, 
Structuralist Poetics (1975); J. Sturrock (ed.) , Structuralism and Since (1979). For specifi-
cally legal applications on the continent, see E . Landowski , La Recherche en Sciences 
Humaines, 1979-1980, (1981) . 
42 Particularly, G. Kalinowski, Introduction a la logique Juridique (1965); A . J. Greimas, 
Semiotique et Sciences Socia/es (1976) 79-128; A . J. Arnaud, Essai d'Analyse Structurale 
du Code Civil Francais (1972) ; G. Mounin, " La Linguistique comme science auxiliere dons 
les disciplines juridique" (1974) 19 Archives de Philosophie du Droit 7. For preliminary 
English language studies, see J. Broekman, "A Structuralist approach to the Philosophy 
of Law" (1975) 49 Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 37; W. 
B. Michaels, "Against Formalism" (1979) 1 Poetics Today 23; R. Kevelson, Inlaws/ 
Outlaws: A Semiotics of Legal Systems (1977); "Semiotics and Structures of Law" (1981) 
35 Semiotica 183; and finally, to a limited extent, W. T. Murphy and R. W. Rawlings, 
"After the Ancien Regime" (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 617, (1982) 45 Modern Law 
Review 34. 
43 The distinction concerns the selection and combination of signs, the two structural axes of 
any sign system. The terms go back to the work of Saussure, op. cit., p. 123 ff, and the 
opposition of "associative field" to "syntagm". It was taken up in its modern form in A. 
Martinet, Elements of General Linguistics (1964); and has received numerous modern 
applications, including the dubious honour of that in F. Burton and P. Carlen, Official 
Discourse (1979). 
44 Whereas Saussure distinguishes signifier and signified as the two elements of the lexical 
203 
sign , later studies have elaborated l\ more complex, cross-cutting distinction between 
denotation (lexical content/reference) and connotation (expression) . The seminal works 
are L. Hjemslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (1%2) ; R. Barthes, Elements, op. 
cit. , pp. 89-94. 
45 The structural opposition between metaphor and metonymy is a confusing one. It prop-
erly belongs to the last great rhetorical treatises of the 18th and 19th centuries (see, T. 
Todorov, Theories of the Symbol, supra , ch. 5; C. Metz, op. cit., Pt. 4) but it received its 
most original treatment in the work of R . Jakobson, Essai de Linguistique Generale 
(1963) . It is confusing because it is treated as a formal distinction between axes of language 
or of the signifying system within recent semiotic work, despite the fact that its derivation 
is rhetorical and semantic. See , on this point , P. Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, op. cit. , 
pp. 174-185; C. Metz, op. cit. , pp. 152 ff. 
46 Especially, G . Kalinowski , op. cit.; K. -Baldinger, Semantic Theory (1980) 42-61; 
E. Landowski, op. cit. , 
47 E. Benveniste, Problems of General Linguistics (1971) ; " La forme et le sens dans le 
language" (1967) Le Langage 27; R. Jakobson , Linguistics (1970) 455 ff. 
48 Most famously his semiotic (logical) quadrants , best approached via A . J. Greimas and F. 
Rastier, "The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints" (1973) Yale French Studies 86; for 
introductory accounts, see J . Culler, Structuralist Poetics, op. cit. ch . 4; J . Larrain, The 
Concept of Ideology (1979) 132-140. By far the most compelling account is to be found in 
F. Jameson, The Political Unconscious (1981) 46-9, 121-27. 
49 A . J . Greimas, Semiotique et Sciences Socia/es, op. cit., p. 79: "our pursuit over a number 
of years, of a method (semiotic) of semantic analysis would have failed if its procedures 
were not applicable to the elucidation of any discourse; if the models proposed were not 
capable of providing an account of the modes of production , of existence and of function-
ing of any text whatsoever. " 
50 Ibid. , pp. 90-4. 
51 Ibid., pp. 88--90. 
52 Ibid., p. 91. 
53 Ibid., p. 92. 
54 I do not intend any substantive distinction between sociolinguistics and discourse analysis-
various perspectives and traditions run across both fields of study . The principal works 
include B. Bernstein, Class, Codes and Control (1971); P. Gigliopoli (ed.) , Language and 
Social Context (1972); V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973) ; 
M.A.K. Halliday, Language as Social Semiotic (1978); R . Fowler et al, Language and 
Control (1979); Hudson , Sociolinguistics (1979); R. Fowler, Literature as Social Discourse 
(1981); T. Pateman, "Linguistics as a branch of critical theory" (1981) 14/15 U.E.A. Papers 
in Linguistics 1; M. Bakhtin , The Dialogic Imagination (1982) ; M. Gurevitch et al. (eds.) , 
Culture, Media and Society (1982) ; D. Morley, The Nationwide Audience (1982); H . Davis 
and P. Walton (eds.), Language, Image, Media (1983); M. Pecheux, Language, Semantics 
and Ideology (1982). For preliminary applications to law , D. Crystal and D . Davey, 
Investigating English Style (1969) ch . 2. ; P. Carlen , Magistrates Justice (1976) ; J. M . 
Atkinson and P. Drew, Order in Court (1979) ; W. L. Bennett and M . S. Feldman, 
Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom (1981) ; D . Carzo, I Segni de/ Potere (1981) ; F. 
Burton and P. Carlen , Official Discourse (1979) ; W. O'Barr, Linguistic Evidence (1982). 
55 For the historical and theoretical basis of these remarks, see T. Eagleton, Walter Benjamin 
(1981) 101-13; T. Eagleton, Literary Theory (1983) 194-218; P. de Mann, Allegories of 
Reading (1979) ch. 1, 5-6; J. Kristeva, Desire in Language (1982) ch. 1; M. Pecheux , op. cit., 
Pts. 1, 2; M. Foucault, The Order of Things (1970) 302-344. 
56 See , F. Nietzsche, Early Greek Philosophy and other Essays (1908) 180 ff. ; P. de Mann , op. 
cit. , pp. 105 ff. 
57 Especially , V . N . Volosinov, op cit., Pt . 1; and under the pseudonymofM. Bakhtin , op. cit. , 
ch. 4; R. Fowler, op. cit., ch . 2. 
58 z. Harris, Discourse Analysis Reprints (1967) 7; for more recent definitions of the discipline, 
see G . Brown and G. Yule , Discourse Analysis (1983) ; M. Stubbs, Discourse Analysis 
(1983). 
204 
59 M. Bakhtin, op. cit., pp. 270-1. 
60 V. Volosinov, op. cit., p. 20ff. 
61 M. Bakhtin, op. cit. , pp. 262-3. 
62 Ibid., p. 401 . I cannot here enter into the linguistic details of such an account of meaning. 
V. N. Volosinov elaborates a useful typology of speech forms according to the contexts of 
group and class interaction. His point is that all signs are ideologically saturated or "multiac-
centuaf' and that the accent or meaning which prevails is the object and outcome of struggle 
between differently oriented sign users, the product of group and class conflict aimed at 
winning credibility for specific accents, interests, meanings and purposes. See V. N. 
Volosinov, op. cit. , pp. 20-25 especially. More recent work in sociolinguistics has elaborated 
the concepts of " register" , " discursive process" and "topic transformation" to depict a 
frequently comparable view of the linguistics of semantic appropriation, or control over 
meaning, as based upon the social and institutional status and significance of the discourse or 
social utterance. See, respectively, M . A . K. Halliday, op. cit., ch. 6, 10; M. Pecheux, op. 
cit., pp. 110-129; H. Davis and P. Walton , op. cit., ch. 3. For the ideological dimensions of 
meaning "effects" see G Therborn, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology 
(1980); M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) 50 ff; A . Gouldner, The 
Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (1976) ch . 2. 
63 Respectively, M. Foucault, op. cit., n. 62, pp. 50-1; Power/Knowledge (1980) 131. See also 
M. Bakhtin, op. cit. , p. 264 ff; R. Fowler, op. cit., p . 111 ff. 
64 The term hermeneutic - meaning little more than speaker's intention or purposiveness 
(Verstehen) - is first used in P.M.S. Hacker and J . Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society 
(1977) ch. l ; while its more recent currency derives from D. N. MacCormick, Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) ch. 8; D. N. MacCormick, H. L.A. Hart. Aside from 
sources already adverted to in terms of Hart's own work, and the extremely useful commen-
taries of M. S. Moore, see H. L. A. Hart "Signs and Words" (1952) 2 Philosophical 
Quarterly 59, for a highly telling account of communication in terms of intention and 
illocution. 
65 The primary source for this slogan is usually taken to be J . L. Austin , Philosophical Papers 
(1%2); J . L. Austin, How to do things with words (1962) . For a criticism of this derivation, 
see G. Sampson, Schools of Linguistics (1980). 
66 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1967) paras. 23-24, 49 , 199-200. 
67 Generally, see P . Ricoeur, op. cit., for an interesting commentary upon the linguistics (lack 
of) of the Oxford School. Also, E . Gellner, Words and Things (2nd. ed. 1980). 
68 H . L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) 4-6, 121-132, 233, 249; Definition and Theory 
(1953); "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) Harvard Law Review 
589. 
69 For J. L. Austin's " linguistic phenomenology', seeJ. L. Austin , Philosophical Papers (1962) 
182 ff; on "illocution", ibid., p. 99 ff. 
70 This is most evident in Ch. Perelman, Logique Juridique (1976) 108, 132, 162-3, 173. 
71 On which point, see Z. Bankowski and G. Maher, "Ordinary Language and Judicial 
Discretion" (1981) 12 Rechtstheorie 1; T . Mathieson, Law, Society and Political Action 
(1980) 89-lll, 140-145. 
72 Particularly, P. Carlen , Magistrates Justice (1976) pp. 18-38, 98-127; W. O'Barr, Linguistic 
Evidence (1982) 61-91, appendix l ; M. Cain , "The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: 
Towards a Radical Conception" in The Sociology of the Professions 1983; eds. R. Dingwall 
and P. Lewis) 106-130. ch. 5. For a somewhat desultory, ethnomethodological, variation 
upon similar themes, see J . M. Atkinson and P. Drew, Order in Court (1979) ch. 1, 2. 
73 For recent and important works concerned with gender and language, see R . Lakoff, 
Language and Women's Place (1975); J . B . Elshtain , "Feminist Discourse and its Discon-
tents: Language, Power and Meaning" (1982) 7 Signs 603; K. McKluskie , "Women's 
Language and Literature" (1983) Feminist Review 51 ; the classic study is D . Spender, Man 
Made Language (1980) , usefully criticised in A . Assiter , "Did Man Make Language?" 
(1983) 34 Radical Philosophy 25; D. Cameron, " Sexism and Semantics" (1984) 36 Radical 
Philosophy 14. 
74 Cf. M. Bakhtin , op. cit. , p. 342 ff. 
205 
75 J. Lenoble and F. Ost, Droit, Mythe e{ Raison (1980) 83 . At p. 87: "It is as though each text 
has entered a secret pact with the institution in whose name it speaks. " More generally, 
T. Mathieson, op. cit., pp. 77-111; G. Therborn, op. cit., p. 80 ff; D. Kairys (ed.), The 
Politics of Law (1983) ch. 3; R. M. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1983) 96 
Harvard Law Review 561; R . Dingwall and P. Lewis (eds.) op. cit. 
76 D. Crystal and D . Davey, op. cit.; W. O'Barr, op. cit. 
77 R. Fowler et al. (eds.) op. cit., ch . 2, 10; H. Davies and P. Walton, op. cit., ch 3, 14; R. 
Fowler, op. cit. , pp. 24-46. 
78 See, M. Pecheux , op. cit., ch. 90 M . Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1980) ch. 5. 
79 E. Edelman, Ownership of the Image (1979); F. Burton and P. Carlen, op. cit. ; M. Bakhtin, 
op. cit., pp. 407-410; N. Poulantzas, State, Power and Socialism (1978) 76-99; J . Palmer and 
F. Pearce, "Legal Discourse and State Power" (1983) ll lnt. Journal of the Sociology of Law 
361. 
80 R. M. Unger, op. cit., especially pp. 665--675; D . McBarnet, Conviction (1983) ch. 8, and 
"Legal Form and Legal Mystification" (1982) 10 Int. Journal of the Sociology of Law 409. 
81 R. M. Unger, op. cit. ; N . Poulanzas, op. cit. ; R. Dingwall and P. Lewis, op. cit. , ch. 5. 
82 Pragmatics is a catch-all term for speech context as a determination of semantic content . For 
recent developments, see D . Sperber and D . Wilson, "Pragmatics" (1981) 10 Cognition 281; 
S. Worth (ed.) Conversation and Discourse (1981) ch. 8; M. Stubbs, Discourse Analysis 
( 1983) ; S. Levinson, Pragmatics (1983) ; D . Sperber and D. Wilson, Foundations of Pragma-
tic Theory (forthcoming, 1984). 
83 M. Bakhtin, op. cit., p. 284; see also R. Fowler, op. cit., pp. 28 ff. 
84 [1982] 1 A.E.R. 129. 
85 Ibid., pp. 131-2. My discussion of the asserted facts - the exordium - will concentrate 
upon the judgments of the Court of Appeal where the depiction of the circumstances of the 
case is most detailed and strident . The House of Lords was able, by and large , to assume 
knowledge of the facts as stated in the Court of Appeal , and so concentrated upon the 
putatively separate issues of law. 
86 Ibid., p. 149. 
87 Ibid., p. 159. 
88 [1925] A .C. 578. 
89 [1954] 3 A.E.R . 698. 
90 Ibid., 706-707. 
91 [1982] 1 A .E.R. 129, at 135. 
9'1 Ibid., 160; see also Lord Wilberforce at p. 154. 
93 Ibid. , p. 158. 
94 Ibid., p. 164. 
95 Ibid., p. 157. 
96 Ibid., p. 132. 
97 Ibid., 158, 174. Lord Scarman comments, " it is a very useful word; chameleon-like, taking 
its colour from its surroundings." 
98 Ibid., 174. 
99 Ibid., 177. 
JOO Ibid., 155. 
101 Ibid., 134-5. 
102 Ibid., 135. 
103 Ibid., 139, 141. 
104 The strongest of which were probably the procedural arguments, although it is impossible to 
view them as wholly isolated from the broader issues. 
105 P. M. Morriss, "Should we subsidise Public Transport?" (1983) 54 Political Quarterly 392, at 
398. 
106 Several recent studies have suggested that on a cost benefit analysis subsidies of urban public 
transport are justified/economic. Cf. S. Glaister, Fundamentals of Transport Economics 
1981) pp. 86-91; A. Grey, Urban Fares Policy (1975) ch. 5.; C. A. Nash, Economics of 
Public Transport (1982) ch. 2. 
107 P. Morriss, op. cit., 394. 
206 
